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ABSTRACT 
Overlaps exist across various doctrines in federal intellectual property law. 
Software can be protected under both copyright law and patent law; logos can be 
protected under both copyright law and trademark law. Design patents provide a 
particular opportunity to consider the issue of overlap, as an industrial design 
that qualifies for design patent protection might also, in particular circumstances, 
qualify for copyright protection as well as function as protectable trade dress. 
When an overlap issue arises—that is, when an intellectual property rights 
holder asserts rights under more than one doctrine—the question then becomes 
how courts should respond. One response, of course, is that courts should do 
nothing, on the theory that the doctrines developed in a way that permit such 
overlapping rights, and so the courts should continue to enforce them. The 
opposing response is to argue that overlapping rights make it difficult for 
intellectual property users to determine the scope of another’s rights, particularly 
when those rights have different terms or limitations, and so the courts should 
require intellectual property owners to choose the right they want enforced at the 
outset. 
Neither response is entirely satisfying. Without some signal from Congress 
that it intended to limit the scope of intellectual property rights when overlaps 
occur, the imposition of restrictions by the courts simply to achieve predictability 
for users seems problematic. At the same time, courts should not be blind to the 
difficulties that doctrinal overlap pose for potential defendants and the temptation 
it presents to intellectual property owners to push for even stronger protection. 
 
* Class of 2014 Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law. Many thanks to participants in Stanford Law School’s “Design Patents in the Modern 
World” conference (in particular, to commentator Graeme Dinwoodie) as well as 
participants in a faculty workshop at the University of Minnesota Law School for helpful 
comments. Thanks also to Patrick Berry and Stefan Oehrlein for research assistance, and to 
the staff of the Stanford Technology Law Review for thoughtful edits and suggestions.  
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This Article therefore proposes something of a middle ground. Courts should 
not require intellectual property owners to elect one form of protection at the 
outset. But they should be attentive to whether the right asserted in any litigation 
proceeding aligns with the harm claimed by the plaintiff and, relatedly, should try 
to devise remedies that address only those harms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is nothing new to note that some aspects of commercial activity can be 
protected under more than one intellectual property regime. Computer software 
can be protected under both copyright law (as a “literary work” comprising 
expressive content) and patent law (as a way of solving a particular inventive 
problem); some logos or other designs can be protected both under copyright 
law (as aesthetically appealing creative works of authorship) and under 
trademark law (as transmitters of meaning that indicate the source of goods or 
services). Until recently, design patents were the often-ignored child in the 
intellectual property family, receiving neither newspaper headlines nor 
widespread scholarly attention. But recent high-profile cases, most prominently 
the Apple-Samsung dispute, have reawakened practitioners and firms to the 
strategic advantages of including design patents in an intellectual property 
portfolio. Design patents present a particular opportunity for overlap, in that an 
ornamental feature that can be protected by a design patent might also be 
protected as a form of expression by copyright law and as a source indicator by 
trademark law (in the form of trade dress). 
From an intellectual property owner’s perspective, the overlap between or 
among regimes is not typically a cause for concern. Seeking protection under 
more than one regime is a belt-and-suspenders form of enforcement, allowing 
the intellectual property owner to resort to a second mode of protection should 
the first fail or expire. But from an intellectual property user’s perspective, 
overlapping protection schemes can make it more difficult for competitors to 
determine what they can do. Material that is the subject of an expired design 
patent, which patent law would put in the public domain, may not be free to use 
without restrictions if courts vindicate continuing trade dress rights in that same 
material. When this occurs, it is not surprising that an intellectual property user 
would feel as if the end of the design patent term has little practical effect. 
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Courts could, of course, choose to do nothing on the grounds that since the 
doctrines permit an overlap of rights, it would be improper to impose a 
limitation. This approach, however, is unsatisfying, as it minimizes very real 
concerns about the proper scope of intellectual property protection. 
Alternatively, courts could, as some commentators have suggested,1 require 
intellectual property owners to elect among doctrines—that is, to choose at the 
outset which form of protection they will employ or to relinquish rights in one 
form if another is chosen. Requiring the intellectual property owner to elect 
among doctrines, however, is difficult to square with the existing federal 
intellectual property scheme, in which Congress has contemplated that 
overlapping rights will exist. Moreover, requiring commitment to only one 
form of protection, whether explicitly or by default, requires careful 
consideration of the nature of future uses, income streams, and doctrinal 
contours, all of which may be difficult to predict ab initio. 
The courts, for their part, have presented what on their face seem to be 
mixed messages in this regard. Many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 
have held that there is no reason to limit intellectual property owners to one 
regime—that simply because something is eligible for copyright protection 
does not mean that it isn’t also eligible for design patent protection. On the 
other hand, many courts—again, including the U.S. Supreme Court—have 
rejected attempts by intellectual property owners to assert another form of 
intellectual property protection once one form is unavailable for particular 
subject matter.2 
This Article, therefore, proposes something of a middle ground. Rather 
than requiring intellectual property owners to elect among overlapping 
intellectual property rights on the front end, courts should address the overlap 
concern by being more attentive to harms and remedies on the back end. In 
other words, the fact that something qualifies for protection under a particular 
intellectual property doctrine does not mean that, in any particular case, the IP 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations and 
the Federal Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 476 (1998) (“Permitting 
plaintiffs to rely on § 43(a) to prevent the copying of product features creates a distinct 
tension with Congress’ plan in enacting the patent and copyright laws.”); Mark P. McKenna, 
An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 891 (2009) 
(suggesting, although recognizing the difficulties in the proposal, that firms be required “to 
elect between forms of protection at the product level”—for example, between patent 
protection for a pharmaceutical and trademark protection for the brand name for the 
pharmaceutical); Matthew Nimetz, Design Protection, 15 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 79, 
85-86 n.23 (1967) (describing the “fundamentally sound view that the creator might have an 
election between the two forms of protection” but noting that “the federal protective scheme 
never intended double protection; if one desires the long-term protection against plagiarizers 
one must be willing to give up one’s ‘idea’ to the public; if one wants a total monopoly over 
any use of the design, one must be satisfied with the terms and conditions of the design 
patent statute”). 
 2.  See infra text accompanying notes 33-128. 
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owner is entitled to a particular remedy. The appropriateness of a remedy 
depends on whether it is tailored to the harm incurred. For example, not every 
injury involving a work subject to a design patent requires an injunction 
forbidding use altogether; if the real harm results from the representations made 
in connection with that use, a narrower injunction, viewed through the lens of 
unfair competition law, might be all that is necessary. 
This approach is not an unfamiliar one. In the copyright and patent realms, 
courts have been willing to term an assertion of rights “misuse” when the 
underlying harm is unrelated to the core interests of the intellectual property 
doctrine. And in other areas of the law, such as defamation, courts have refused 
to allow plaintiffs to avoid restrictions posed by the First Amendment and 
statutes of limitations simply by renaming their legal claims. In all of these 
cases, courts have solved the problem of overlapping doctrines by looking 
beyond the label attached to the claim to inquire more deeply about harms and 
remedies. 
To be clear, by suggesting the same approach in intellectual property cases, 
I am not suggesting that IP owners who assert overlapping rights are 
necessarily engaging in malfeasance. If two forms of protection are both 
available for a single article, it is not automatically unlawful or duplicitous to 
assert both. At the same time, however, courts should not provide 
sledgehammer remedies to redress fly-sized harms. 
I. OVERLAPS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
The current condition of overlap in intellectual property law results both 
from the multifaceted nature of many articles of creation or invention and from 
an expansion of the various doctrines beyond their more limited origins. 
For example, both the subject matter of design patents and the subject 
matter of copyright law generally concern items with aesthetic appeal for their 
intended audience and exclude from their scope items that are useful or 
functional (as does trademark law), leaving protection of useful items to the 
utility patent regime. Thus, it is possible for a single design to be subject both 
to the lengthy term of copyright law and to the considerably shorter term of 
design patent law. Similarly, because both design patent law and trade dress 
law base their rights on the relevant audience’s appreciation or understanding 
of the distinctiveness of a particular design, it is possible for a single design 
both to satisfy the novelty requirement of design patent law and the secondary 
meaning requirement of trade dress law and thus to be subject both to the 
limited term of protection of design patent law as well as the potentially 
unlimited term of protection of trade dress law. 
The nature of the overlap has been augmented by an expansion and 
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morphing of the boundaries of the various doctrines.3 Copyright’s early focus 
on works of fine art (once it moved beyond its original scope of books, maps, 
and charts) would not initially have posed any risk of doctrinal overlap with 
design patent law, which was contemplated to extend only to works of 
industrial design.4 As copyright’s scope expanded away from fine art toward 
encompassing works of authorship with potential commercial uses, however, 
the overlap between copyright’s realm and that of design patent increased. The 
1909 Copyright Act described the subject matter of copyright as “all the 
writings of an author,” without any specific reference to the fine arts,5 and by 
1917, the Copyright Office had amended its regulations to allow registration of 
“artistic drawings not withstanding they may afterwards be utilized for articles 
of manufacture,” with a further amendment in 1949 to allow registration of 
“published or unpublished works or artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form 
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.”6 
In the courts, the turning point was Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Co., in which the Court held that copyright protection could not be denied to 
the artwork featured in a circus advertisement merely because the art was being 
used toward commercial rather than purely aesthetic ends.7 Thus, the scope of 
copyright no longer turned on whether a work of authorship furthered 
knowledge or existed in the rarefied air of the fine arts; rather, so long as the 
work met minimal requirements of creativity and originality, it could be 
 
 3.  See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of 
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1496 (2004) 
(“[O]verlapping protection has arisen mostly by accretion, as a result of the expansion of 
intellectual property rights, rather than by design.”); see also id. at 1511-12 (discussing 
overlap of design patent rights with both copyright and trademark). 
 4.  Protection was extended to “painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of 
models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts” in 1870. Act of July 8, 
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1916); Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and 
Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 
707, 710 (1983). In the 1909 Copyright Act, protection was afforded to “[w]orks of art; 
models or designs for works of art,” without any reference to the fine arts. Copyright Act of 
1909, ch. 320, § 5(g), 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 1976); Denicola, supra, at 710; see also 
Gregory R. Mues, Dual Copyright and Design Patent Protection: Works of Art and 
Ornamental Designs, 49 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 543, 557 (1975) (“At the time the first design 
patent legislation was enacted, copyright protection was reserved to works of purely 
intellectual or fine art value. On the other hand, the existing mechanical patent statutes were 
devoted to the furtherance and protection of industrial advancement. Thus, since the purpose 
of applied designs was commercial enterprise, it was reasonable that regulation fall under the 
patent laws.” (footnote omitted)). 
 5.  § 4, 35 Stat. at 1076; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 210 (1954). 
 6.  Denicola, supra note 4, at 710-11 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 201.4(7) (1917) and 37 
C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1949)); see also Barton Beebe, Bleistein, Copyright Law, and the 
Problem of Aesthetic Progress 30-35 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (tracing 
the history of the Copyright Act). 
 7.  188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
244 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:239 
protected, even if the work was being deployed to overtly commercial ends.8 
And because copyright infringement now can be shown not merely with near-
identical copying but with works that are “substantially similar” to the 
copyrighted work, it is more difficult to draw clean lines between copyright law 
and design patent. So while a commentator could write in 1975 that, assuming 
an antique telephone casing was protected both by design patent and by 
copyright, “[u]pon the expiration of the design patent, the design would be free 
for public use,” and that “[t]he remaining copyright would only protect the 
owner from the slavish copying of his antique casing and any noticeable 
variation in a similar casing would foreclose a copyright infringement claim,”9 
such an assertion would be unsupported by modern case law. 
Design patents saw a similar expansion. Congress originally enacted design 
patent law in response to a belief that the design of industrial articles, in 
addition to their functional aspects, should be encouraged and protected from 
commercial copying. Such protection had been available in France and England 
in the 1700s, and it was the perceived comparative disadvantage of the United 
States in this regard that Commission of Patents Henry Ellsworth highlighted in 
his 1841 report to Congress, noting, “Competition among manufacturers for the 
latest patterns prompts to the highest effort to secure improvements, and calls 
out the inventive genius of our citizens.”10 Congress responded by enacting the 
first law in the U.S. to protect industrial design.11 As was said of a 1902 
amendment, the law was intended to provide protection for “objects of new and 
artistic quality pertaining . . . to commerce,” as opposed to the “objects of art” 
protected by copyright law and the “mechanical constructions possessing utility 
of mechanical function” protected by utility patents.12 
The precise assumptions underlying the enactment are unclear. 
Presumably, there is something of the incentive theory that is the dominant 
justification in the U.S. for patent law and copyright law: that authors and 
inventors will be disinclined to bring their works and inventions forth if second 
comers can easily copy their works and then sell them in the market for the 
marginal cost of copying (i.e., without the need to recoup the costs of 
 
 8.  Mues, supra note 4, at 561 (“[Bleistein’s] judicial inroad of the copyright into the 
commercial sphere, previously occupied solely by the design patent, provided a significant 
step forward in the ultimate realization of dual coverage.”); see also Beebe, supra note 6, at 
38-43 (discussing Bleistein’s principle of aesthetic neutrality). 
 9.  See Mues, supra note 4, at 567 (discussing Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 
F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). 
 10. HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 27-74, at 2 (2d Sess. 1841), quoted in Thomas B. Hudson, A Brief History of the 
Development of Design Patent Protection in the United States, 30 J. PAT OFF. SOC’Y 380, 
380 (1948). 
 11.  See Design Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543-44. 
 12.  S. REP. NO. 57-1139, at 3 (1902) (statement of Commissioner of Patents Frederick 
Innes Allen), quoted in Hudson, supra note 10, at 390-91. 
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development or invention). On this theory, design patents are ultimately 
justified as benefiting the public, which enjoys an increase in the aesthetically 
pleasing character of industrial goods that would not otherwise exist. There is 
also probably something of a fairness or other moral concern regarding copying 
the work of others without having engaged in the toil of authorship or 
invention. Here, the benefit of the law is contemplated for the designer, not the 
public: prohibiting misappropriation and unlawful free riding, as well as a 
valorization of industrial design as a cousin to fine art and mechanical 
inventions. Thus, as one commentator wrote: 
The articles themselves may have been of common usage and knowledge, e.g., 
spoons or forks, and therefore not worthy of a mechanical patent, which at one 
time was the sole protection available. Yet, the manufacturer of these 
implements may have used his inventive genius in designing their shape, 
configuration, or ornamentation so as to present an attractive article for sale. 
Nevertheless, since the designer of these ornate utensils was without statutory 
protection, his design could be freely copied by others less talented. The 
designer was thereby deprived of the fruits of his labor.13 
Despite the initial goal of providing protection only for aesthetically 
appealing articles of manufacture, later court decisions resulted in a more 
expansive scope of design patent law. The Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, in its 1930 decision in In re Koehring, reversed a decision by the 
Commissioner of Patents denying a design patent for a concrete mixer truck 
body and frame.14 While the Commissioner, and the dissent, believed that such 
items were not contemplated to be the subject of design patents (as opposed to 
objects with more understandable aesthetic appeal), the majority held that “the 
beauty and ornamentation requisite in design patents is not confined to such as 
may be found in the ‘esthetic or fine arts.’”15 Thus, by the mid-twentieth 
century, it was established that both copyright protection and design patent 
protection extended to works with uses in the commercial realm with some 
degree of aesthetic appeal, regardless of whether that appeal could be said to be 
refined. 
The expansion of trademark law’s protection to encompass product design 
trade dress (as opposed to merely product packaging), as well as the expansion 
of liability to include not only uses of the plaintiff’s mark that diverted 
consumers from the plaintiff to the defendant but also uses that suggested a 
 
 13.  Mues, supra note 4, at 555-56 (footnote omitted); see also Sarah Burstein, Visual 
Invention, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 172 (2012) (“The decorative arts differ from the 
fine arts primarily in the constraints imposed upon the designer’s creative expression.”). 
 14.  37 F.2d 421, 421, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1930). 
 15.  Id. at 422 (noting that Congress, in enacting design patent law, “expressed a desire 
to promote more beauty, grace, and ornamentation in things used, observed, and enjoyed by 
our people,” and “had in mind the elimination of much of the unsightly repulsiveness that 
characterizes many machines and mechanical devices which have a tendency to depress 
rather than excite the esthetic sense”). 
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sponsorship or authorization relationship also contributed to the overlap 
between trademark law and design patents.16 As with the copyright/design 
interface, the trademark/design overlap emanated from broad statutory 
language (here, in the Lanham Act) that courts took at face value. The language 
of the Lanham Act, the Court declared in Qualitex Co v. Jacobson Products 
Co., “says that trademarks ‘include any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof.’ Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ 
almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read 
literally, is not restrictive.”17 Given this broad reading, there is nothing in the 
Lanham Act itself that prevents extension of trademark protection to product 
configurations as a category, save for the exclusion of functional subject 
matter, which is left to the realm of utility patents.18 Thus, similarly to the 
commentator discussed above, where a commentator in 1967 could plausibly 
write that the trademark and design patent overlap was in one respect narrow 
because, even when a design patent on a decanter expired, trademark law 
would not prevent its use “in contexts other than the sale of liquor,”19 federal 
trademark law has since moved far from that limited scope. 
Thus, on a broad view, the various intellectual property regimes present 
significant areas of overlap. But when we look at the particular interests at the 
core of each doctrine, differences do emerge. For example, although both 
copyright law and design patent law concern aesthetics, and are both 
constitutionally concerned with promoting “progress,” the two regimes have 
different views of when progress has been achieved. Because copyright law has 
no novelty requirement, unlike design patent law, it is difficult to say that it has 
any real concern with advancement in aesthetics. As Barton Beebe has noted, 
copyright law’s theory is that the more works that are encouraged, the more 
likely it is that we will end up with something worthwhile.20 Design patent law, 
 
 16.  J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States 
Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 125 (1989) (“[T]he 
federal appellate courts generally have expanded the protection of product configurations as 
‘appearance trade dress’ under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, with the result that its 
anticompetitive thrust may actually exceed that of state unfair competition laws prior to the 
Sears-Compco decisions of 1964.”). 
 17.  514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994)). 
 18.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2011) (providing basis for refusal of registration for a 
mark that “comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional”); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. 
Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28-29 (2001) (noting that although “[i]t is well 
established that trade dress can be protected under federal law,” trade dress protection “may 
not be claimed for product features that are functional”). 
 19.  Nimetz, supra note 1, at 90. 
 20.  Beebe, supra note 6, at 47 (“[H]ow can copyright law claim to promote progress, 
aesthetic or otherwise, when it has no progress-based standard for copyrightability? . . . More 
copyright protection will generate more expression, goes the argument, and some of this 
expression, we trust, will promote aesthetic progress, be that progress in the form of more 
pleasingly diverse expression, more pleasingly beautiful expression, or simply more pleasing 
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by contrast, is focused on encouraging advances in design. By requiring 
novelty, it is concerned with progress in a more linear sense: the development 
of the practice of design over time.21 
Neither design patent nor trade dress rights, to take another overlap, exist 
without some engagement with an audience: the examiner at the Patent and 
Trademark Office who deems the design novel or the relevant group of 
consumers who recognize the trade dress as distinctive. However, unlike design 
patents, trademark law is not concerned with the aesthetic reaction to a design 
but rather with the denotative meaning attached to that design. Trademark law 
does not reward aesthetic appeal or any conception of whether the development 
of the trademark promotes any sort of progress in the useful arts; a trademark is 
simply a sign that substitutes for a larger collection of information about the 
source of a particular good or service. 
All three regimes overlap in the sense that audience or consumer reaction is 
the touchstone for infringement. But audience reaction presents more of an 
overlap concern at the copyright/design patent interface than it does at the other 
two interfaces.22 Infringement of a design patent “requires that the designs have 
the same general visual appearance, such that it is likely that the purchaser 
would be deceived into confusing the design of the accused article with the 
patent design.”23 For both copyright infringement and design patent 
infringement, then, the test is whether the ordinary observer would find the 
plaintiff’s work or invention and the defendant’s work or invention the same, 
taking into account the unprotectable elements of the subject matter.24 Because 
 
expression.”). 
 21.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“The dichotomy of protection for the 
aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of original and 
ornamental design for design patents”); Mues, supra note 4, at 572 (“[T]he aspects protected 
by the copyright and design patent are distinct. For the copyright, it is original pure art 
divorced from any utilitarian embodiment, while for the design patent, it is inventive artistic 
ornamentation applied to commercial endeavor.”). 
 22.  I have already considered the copyright/trademark overlap in Laura A. Heymann, 
The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 90-93 (2007). 
 23.  Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 162 F.3d 1113, 
1118 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 24.  Compare Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872) (design 
patents) (“We hold, therefore, that if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such 
attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the 
resemblance is such as to deceive an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to 
be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”), and Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. 
Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (design patents) (holding that the 
test for design patent infringement is whether the ordinary observer would find the two 
designs to be substantially the same, in light of the prior art), with Harney v. Sony Pictures 
Television, Inc., 704 F.3d 173, 179 (9th Cir. 2013) (copyright) (“We have explained that two 
works are substantially similar [for purposes of a copyright infringement analysis] if [the] 
‘ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook 
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.’” (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v. 
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both regimes are directed, at least in the United States, toward protection of the 
IP owner’s economic interests, the similarity test is meant to determine whether 
the defendant’s work or invention serves as a substitute in the market for the 
plaintiff’s.25 This makes sense in both regimes because the appeal of the 
subject matter to the audience’s aesthetic perception is what defines the nature 
of the subject matter and, presumably, motivates its creation. This analysis does 
not, of itself, concern itself with the consumer’s understanding as to the source 
of the goods. That is, one commits copyright or design patent infringement 
simply by copying the protected subject matter, regardless of whether that 
subject matter is recognizable to consumers as the work of the rights holder or 
whether it is presented as the work of the copier.26 
In a trademark infringement case, consumer reaction and similarity are also 
the touchstones, although the ultimate inquiry is different. Here, the question is 
whether the plaintiff’s good or service and the defendant’s good or service are 
presented as deriving from the same source or are otherwise related when they 
in fact are not. Contrary to copyright law and design patent law, which prohibit 
unauthorized similarity between two sets of goods, trademark law prohibits 
false declarations of similarity between two sets of goods, as expressed through 
the use of the trademark. Indeed, if the two sets of goods are in fact the same—
the defendant is using the Louis Vuitton trademark to sell a genuine Louis 
Vuitton handbag, for example—there should be no trademark infringement at 
all. 
Thus, it is not necessarily the case that something protected by a design 
patent will also function as a source indicator and thus be potentially 
protectable as trade dress, although it is more likely that this will occur with 
design patents as compared with utility patents. There are many patented 
inventions installed internally in the typical computer or television, but because 
none of them are visible to the consumer, their appearance is unlikely to be 
used as a way of conveying information about the source of the good. Design 
patents, however, present a greater possibility of overlap because the heart of a 
 
Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988))). 
 25.  See, e.g., Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(describing the similarity in a patent infringement case as “market confusion”). 
 26.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has described design patent infringement in 
terms that sound very much like trademark infringement. In Gorham, the Court wrote: 
It is persons of [ordinary intelligence] who are the principal purchasers of the articles to 
which designs have given novel appearances, and if they are misled, and induced to purchase 
what is not the article they supposed it to be, if, for example, they are led to purchase forks or 
spoons, deceived by an apparent resemblance into the belief that they bear the ‘cottage’ 
design, and, therefore, are the production of the holders of the Gorham, Thurber, and Dexter 
patent, when in fact they are not, the patentees are injured, and that advantage of a market 
which the patent was granted to secure is destroyed. 
Id. at 528. It would seem that the deception of the consumer should not matter at all to 
design patents, as the patent would be equally infringed if the consumer were fully aware 
that the manufacturer of the second item was not the plaintiff. 
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design patent is something that is visible and appreciated by the consumer. To 
the extent the subject of a design patent has value because of its ornamentation, 
it may also serve as a source indicator in that it simultaneously indicates to the 
consumer who is responsible for the pleasing design. 
The fact that design patents and trade dress are directed at different types 
of consumer reaction does not mean that the two are less likely to be asserted 
concurrently or sequentially than design patent and copyright. Indeed, as a 
practical matter, the assertion of concurrent or sequential design patent 
protection and trade dress protection is more likely to arise than the similar 
assertion of design patent and copyright. As Sarah Burstein has written, if the 
design at issue is solely an applied design (in other words, essentially sits on 
top of and is conceptually separable from the underlying product), it is likely to 
be protectable by copyright law as well as by a design patent.27 Given the 
longer term and cheaper cost of acquisition of copyright protection, as well as 
the fact that copyrighted matter is protected from the time of fixation, rather 
than only after examination, an IP owner could reasonably choose not to 
undergo the expense of design patent acquisition if it could achieve protection 
via copyright law.28 By contrast, because trade dress protection for product 
design attaches only once the trade dress has acquired secondary meaning in 
the marketplace, a process that could take a year or more, an IP owner might be 
more motivated to seek a design patent at the outset of the design’s release to 
the market, particularly when (as is reportedly the case at present) the time span 
for design patent acquisition is on the order of months.29 
 
 27.  Burstein, supra note 13, at 174 n.25 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a situation in 
which a rational designer would incur the cost of obtaining a design patent for a design 
directed solely to surface ornamentation.”); see also Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent 
Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2014) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2273840 (arguing for bright-line rule 
that industrial design should not be protected at all by copyright law because “if there is 
uncertainty, industrial designers are likely to pursue copyright protection rather than 
patent”). 
 28.  Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 
887, 894-95 (writing in 1988 that “[f]or most designs, standard of invention is too high, the 
time required to obtain [design patent] protection too long, and the expense and bother of 
doing so too great in view of the probable returns”). As with other rapidly developing 
copyrightable subject matter, such as software, it is unclear how often copyright protection 
can be usefully invoked after the first few years of protection. 
 29.  Design Patents Are Still Relatively Quick, PATENTLY-O, (Jan. 20, 2013, 6:29 AM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/design-patents-are-still-relatively-quick.html 
(“[T]he bulk of design patents are issued within 12-months of the filing date and only a 
handful take more than three years to issue. . . . [M]ost design patents are issued without 
substantive rejection or amendment.”). 
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II. ENFORCING OVERLAPPING IP RIGHTS 
The availability of more than one form of intellectual property protection 
for a single subject matter might be beneficial for an intellectual property 
owner but it poses some difficulty for those who are concerned about liability 
for unauthorized use. An entity that copies another’s design, for example, 
cannot be confident that it is on safe ground if it ensures that it satisfies 
copyright law’s fair use defense if the article is also protected by design patent 
law, which contains no fair use defense. If the design also functions as a 
company logo, further complications are raised given that fair use under the 
Lanham Act exists only in a limited number of narrow (and contested) statutory 
provisions, supplemented by vague First Amendment-related doctrines that 
have developed in the courts.30 
The different terms for each regime also raise concerns about use of the 
subject matter once the protections of a particular regime expire. For example, 
the design patent term in the United States is currently fourteen years.31 Once 
that term expires, design patent doctrine presumes that anyone is free to make 
the design that was the subject matter of the design patent. If that design is also 
protected by trade dress, however, and the design is still in use by the entity 
claiming trademark rights in it, the use of the design by a competitor might be 
alleged to be trade dress infringement. 
It is for these reasons that some commentators have suggested that 
intellectual property owners be required to elect among regimes at the outset or, 
relatedly, to be held to the requirements of the regime whose protections expire 
first.32 In the case of a design patent, where either copyright law or trademark 
law would also apply, those rights would expire at the same time as the 
expiration of the design patent rights, as the design patent carries the shortest 
term. This proposal presents several complications. First, a doctrine of election 
is unlikely to be implemented by the same judicial system that participated in 
the expansion of intellectual property regimes discussed above. Additionally, a 
rule that held that intellectual property protections in overlap situations last 
only as long as the shortest term suffers from a similar lack of grounding in the 
doctrine and does nothing to solve the overlap problem during that term. 
 
 30.  See generally William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 49 (2008); William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
2267 (2010). 
  31.  35 U.S.C. § 173 (2011) (“Patents for designs shall be granted for the term of 
fourteen years from the date of grant.”). But see Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-211, § 102(7), 126 Stat. 1527, 1532 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 173 “by 
striking ‘fourteen years’ and inserting ‘15 years’”). 
 32.  See supra note 1. Relatedly, several commentators have suggested amending the 
law so as to eliminate the overlap, such as eliminating copyright protection for “works of 
artistic craftsmanship.” See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-Like Protection for Designs, 19 
U. BALT. L. REV. 308, 321 (1989). 
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Moreover, it is unlikely that supporters of such a proposal would require a 
company that abandoned commercial use of a novel design to give up its design 
patent rights because it could no longer assert trade dress rights. 
In order to explain why a remedies-focused approach is the preferred 
solution, I begin with an overview of judicial reactions to overlapping 
intellectual property regimes. As the next Subparts will show, courts take 
different views on the appropriateness of the overlap, depending on whether the 
issue is the existence of the right in the first instance or the assertion of the right 
in a later infringement suit. 
A. Establishing Overlapping Rights 
Earlier decisions held that the owner of subject matter that could qualify 
either for a design patent or for copyright protection must elect one regime at 
the time of registration. In each of these cases, the overlap question arose either 
as the result of an attempt to register rights when one set of rights had already 
been registered or as the result of an attempt to challenge the acquisition of 
rights as improper given the subject matter. 
In Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., a 1910 circuit court 
case, the defendant attempted to defend against copyright infringement of the 
plaintiff’s painting of holly, mistletoe, and spruce arranged in a square by 
arguing that the painting was created and intended for use on wrapping paper 
and so should have been limited to protection under design patent law.33 The 
court rejected this argument, noting that, post-Bleistein, the design qualified for 
copyright protection and so “could not be definitely assigned for the present 
purpose either to the fine or to the useful arts, until the author or the owner 
decided under which statute he would protect his property.”34 But, the court 
cautioned, “it could not enter both,” since “[t]he method of procedure, the term 
of protection, and the penalties for infringement, are so different that the author 
or owner of a painting that is eligible for both classes must decide to which 
region of intellectual effort the work is to be assigned, and he must abide by the 
decision.”35 The question of election, however, was not directly presented in 
the case (and so the court’s comments were dicta), as the case involved only 
“whether a painting possessing artistic merit, but suitable also for use as a 
design, may at the owner’s election be protected either by copyright or by 
patent.”36 
In re Blood, a 1927 appellate case, held similarly, as it affirmed the Patent 
Office’s refusal of a design patent registration for the shape of a ticket in light 
 
 33.  182 F. 150, 151 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910). 
 34.  Id. at 151. 
 35.  Id. at 152. 
 36.  Id. at 153. 
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of the applicant’s existing trademark registration of the same design, with text, 
as a label for its goods.37 “The design is not entitled to double registration, once 
as a label design, and again as a design for a hosiery ticket,” held the court.38  
Such a course would result for all practical purposes in an extension of the 
design monopoly. The applicant was entitled to apply for a patent for the 
design as a hosiery label, or he might complete the label, and register the 
design, so completed, as a label. He could not do both. He elected to pursue 
the latter course, and has obtained the protection thereby assured to him, and 
he is bound by that election.39 
By the mid-twentieth century, however, the view of the courts on 
concurrent rights changed. In Mazer v. Stein, a 1954 Supreme Court opinion, 
the plaintiff had secured a copyright in statuettes that it intended to mass 
produce as lamp bases.40 The defendants, who had copied the statuettes without 
authorization for their own lamps, defended against a copyright infringement 
suit, as the defendant did in De Jonge, by alleging that the plaintiff’s 
“publication as a lamp and registration as a statue to gain a monopoly in 
manufacture” constituted a misuse of copyright law and that the plaintiff should 
instead be limited to a design patent.41 The Court, having held that the 
statuettes were copyrightable,42 declined to assess whether the statuettes could 
also be protected by a design patent. But even if they could, the Court held, this 
did not render the plaintiff’s use of copyright law illegitimate: “[T]he 
patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright 
as works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a 
thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so hold.”43 The 
Court further held that this principle applied whether the copyright registration 
took place before or after the work was embodied in the useful article; such 
registration did not, the Court asserted, constitute copyright misuse.44 
Because the Mazer Court did not have to decide whether the statuettes 
were also protected by design patent, it did not reach the question of 
overlapping regimes. Subsequent cases in the lower courts, however, rejected 
the argument that an intellectual property owner, having availed itself of one 
regime, should be barred from acquiring rights under another regime. 
 
 37.  23 F.2d 772, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927). 
  38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954). 
 41.  Id. at 206; see also id. at 216 (“Petitioner urges that overlapping of patent and 
copyright legislation so as to give an author or inventor a choice between patents and 
copyrights should not be permitted.”). 
 42.  Id. at 213-14. Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, questioned whether this was an 
appropriate conclusion. See id. at 219-21 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 43.  Id. at 217 (majority opinion). 
 44.  Id. at 218-19. 
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In In re Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., a 1964 Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) had 
refused to grant Mogen David Wine Corporation a trademark registration on 
the Principal Register for a wine decanter, as the plaintiff was already the 
owner (by assignment) of a design patent for the same decanter.45 In its 1959 
decision in In re The Pepsi-Cola Co., the TTAB had held that the existence of a 
design patent for a spirally-fluted bottle for carbonated beverages did not 
preclude the registration of the bottle on the Supplemental Register.46 
Congress, the TTAB held, clearly contemplated the use of the Supplemental 
Register to receive trademark protection in foreign countries, even during the 
term of a design patent.47 Reconciling its decision in the Pepsi-Cola case, the 
TTAB had held in Mogen David Wine that because registration on the 
Supplemental Register afforded the owner no presumptions of exclusive use, 
there was no risk of extending the monopoly enjoyed under the design patent.48 
Registration on the Principal Register, by contrast, would “be inimical to the 
rights of others conditioned under the patent grant to make fair use of the 
subject matter after expiration of the patent.”49 But the CCPA rejected this 
argument on appeal: 
[T]rademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair competition, which 
happen to continue beyond the expiration of a design patent, do not ‘extend’ 
the patent monopoly. They exist independently of it, under different law and 
for different reasons. The termination of either has no legal effect on the 
continuance of the other. When the patent monopoly ends, it ends. The 
trademark rights do not extend it. We know of no provision of patent law, 
statutory or otherwise, that guarantees to anyone an absolute right to copy the 
subject matter of any expired patent. Patent expiration is nothing more than 
the cessation of the patentee’s right to exclude held under the patent law. 
Conversely, trademarks conceivably could end through non use during the life 
of a patent. We doubt it would be argued that the patent rights should also 
expire so as not to “extend” them.50 
In In re Yardley,51 a 1974 case from the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, the court once again addressed the doctrinal overlap question, this 
time as to design patent and copyright. The applicant sought a design patent for 
 
 45.  328 F.2d 925, 926 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 46.  120 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959). 
 47.  Id. 
  48.  Mogen David Wine, 328 F.2d at 927. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 930; see also id. at 928 (“As a manufacturer, one may make any unpatented 
article, but as a vendor, he may be restricted in the interest of fair competition.” (quoting 1 
HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 390 (4th ed. 1947) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 51.  493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Commentators have identified Yardley as the case 
in which courts broke with a prior history of requiring election. See, e.g., Mues, supra note 
4, at 543. 
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the ornamental design for a watch face (featuring a caricature of Spiro Agnew 
in which the arms and hands served as the hands of the watch). The examiner 
rejected the claim both on obviousness grounds and on estoppel grounds, given 
three existing copyright registrations for the same design, and that rejection was 
affirmed by the Patent Office Board of Appeals.52 On appeal, the court held 
that the existing copyright registrations should not themselves be a bar to 
obtaining design patent protection. First, the court noted, Congress must have 
intended there to be an overlap between statutory subject matter in copyright 
and statutory subject matter in design patent because the statutory provisions as 
to eligible subject matter facially admitted of such overlap.53 Second, the court 
concluded, requiring election between the two doctrines would therefore be “in 
direct conflict with the clear intent of Congress manifested in the two statutory 
provisions,”54 because Congress did not indicate a need to elect between the 
two doctrines in cases of overlapping eligibility.55 
Such cases led the Seventh Circuit in its 1993 opinion in Kohler Co. v. 
Moen, Inc., to conclude that courts had generally held that “a product’s 
different qualities can be protected simultaneously, or successively, by more 
than one of the statutory means for protection of intellectual property.”56 The 
case involved claims to both trade dress rights and design patent rights over 
faucet and faucet handle designs. Kohler, the defendant, contended that trade 
dress rights in product configurations were impermissible because intellectual 
property rights in industrial design should be the sole domain of design patents; 
to accord trade dress rights in configurations, Kohler argued, would 
impermissibly extend the patent term.57 The Seventh Circuit rejected that 
argument, noting that because “[t]rademark protection is dependent only on 
public reaction to the trademark in the marketplace rather than solely on the 
similarity of the configurations,” the two regimes were conceptually and legally 
distinct.58 Put otherwise, “[a] design patent gives the patentee a virtually 
absolute monopoly in the design, while a trademark allows competitive uses of 
a protected design so long as such uses do not create consumer confusion.”59 
The court held that Kohler was “free to copy Moen’s design so long as it 
 
 52.  Id. at 1390-92. 
 53.  Id. at 1394. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  By 1995, the Copyright Office had also come around to the idea that there was “no 
longer any legal justification” for refusing copyright registration to elements of pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works for which a design patent had been issued. See Registrability 
of Pictorial, Graphic, or Sculptural Works Where a Design Patent Has Been Issued, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 15605 (Copyright Office Mar. 24, 1995) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 202.10). 
 56.  12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993). 
  57.  Id. at 637. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 638 n.8. 
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insures that the public is not thereby deceived or confused into believing that its 
copy is a Moen faucet.”60 Notably, as it was reacting only to the argument that 
acquisition of overlapping rights was impermissible, the court did not need to 
reach the question of enforcement—in other words, whether the mere copying 
of Moen’s faucet would be sufficient grounds for concluding that the public 
would be “confused into believing that [Kohler’s] copy is a Moen faucet.”61 (I 
address this question later.)62 
Finally, although it was not the focus of the opinion, the Supreme Court 
lent its voice in 2000 to the chorus of courts finding no doctrinal issue with 
simultaneous intellectual property rights. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara 
Brothers, Inc., the plaintiff had claimed that the design of its children’s dresses 
was protectable trade dress and that Wal-Mart had engaged in trademark 
infringement by commissioning a manufacturer to produce dresses featuring a 
similar design.63 The question in the case was whether the design of a product 
could be deemed inherently distinctive (and thus protectable as a mark ab 
initio) or whether the plaintiff should have to show that the design functioned 
as a source indicator by providing proof of acquired meaning. In holding that 
product design could not be inherently distinctive, and that proof that the 
design had acquired a source-identifying meaning was required,64 the Court 
specifically highlighted the ability of the designer to turn to other intellectual 
property regimes for protection before acquired meaning could be developed: 
Competition is deterred, however, not merely by successful suit but by the 
plausible threat of successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of inherently 
source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged 
inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle. That is especially so 
since the producer can ordinarily obtain protection for a design that is 
inherently source identifying (if any such exists), but that does not yet have 
secondary meaning, by securing a design patent or a copyright for the 
design—as, indeed, respondent did for certain elements of the designs in this 
case. The availability of these other protections greatly reduces any harm to 
the producer that might ensue from our conclusion that a product design 
cannot be protected under § 43(a) without a showing of secondary meaning.65 
 
 60.  Id. at 640 n.10; see also Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 955, 
960 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting and construing Kohler, 12 F.2d at 638, 640 n.10). 
  61.  Kohler, 12 F.2d at 640 n.10; cf. Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. 
L. REV. 823, 844 (2011) (calling the court’s assertion that Kohler was free to copy Moen’s 
design “remarkably disingenuous, for the effect of trade dress protection was to deny Kohler 
the ability to copy Moen’s design for the purpose of competing with Moen in the market for 
faucets”). 
  62.   See infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text. 
  63.  529 U.S. 205, 207-08 (2000). 
  64.  See id. at 216. 
 65.  Id. at 214. But see Nimetz, supra note 1, at 90 (“[T]he statutory monopoly granted 
by the [design] patent is intended to give the producer time to recover his development costs; 
it is not intended to supply a period in which to develop consumer association of the design 
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The Court thus contemplated that an IP owner might successfully, and 
properly, invoke all three regimes for an inherently distinctive design: 
copyright or design patent at the outset of the design’s use, and trademark law 
once the design had spent enough time in the marketplace to acquire meaning 
as a source identifier. 
B. Enforcing Overlapping Rights 
Taken together, the cases discussed in the previous section establish the 
view of the federal courts that there is no threshold restriction on acquiring 
overlapping intellectual property rights for the same subject matter, provided 
that the requirements of each regime are met. These cases do not, however, 
dictate to what extent a particular intellectual property right will be enforced in 
any particular case, an issue that obviously cannot be resolved without taking 
the interests of the putative defendant into account. 
One of these interests is the ability to use the subject matter of the 
intellectual property right once the term of protection has ended. In patent and 
copyright law cases, this interest is often expressed in the contractual terms of a 
quid pro quo: that implicit in the grant of the limited monopoly is a return 
promise to dedicate the subject matter of the grant to the public domain after 
the expiration of the term. The argument is made most strongly in patent cases. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Grant v. Raymond in 1832: 
[I]t cannot be doubted that the settled purpose of the United States has ever 
been, and continues to be, to confer on the authors of useful inventions an 
exclusive right in their inventions for the time mentioned in their patent. It is 
the reward stipulated for the advantages derived by the public for the exertions 
of the individual, and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions. The laws 
which are passed to give effect to this purpose ought, we think, to be 
construed in the spirit in which they have been made; and to execute the 
contract fairly on the part of the United States, where the full benefit has been 
actually received: if this can be done without transcending the intention of the 
statute, or countenancing acts which are fraudulent or may prove mischievous. 
The public yields nothing which it has not agreed to yield; it receives all 
which it has contracted to receive. The full benefit of the discovery, after its 
enjoyment by the discoverer for fourteen years, is preserved; and for his 
exclusive enjoyment of it during that time the public faith is pledged.66 
 
with the producer so that it will qualify as a trademark.”). 
 66.  31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832). The Court continued the contract analogy 
later in the opinion, in which it considered whether an error in the patent could be corrected 
and the patent reissued for the remainder of the existing term, or whether the error rendered 
the patent invalid: 
The communication of the discovery to the public has been made in pursuance of law, with 
the intent to exercise a privilege which is the consideration paid by the public for the future 
use of the machine. If, by an innocent mistake, the instrument introduced to secure this 
privilege fails in its object, the public ought not to avail itself of this mistake, and to 
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Likewise, the Court stated in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co., 
Inc., in 1945 that “the means adopted by Congress of promoting the progress of 
science and the arts is the limited grant of the patent monopoly in return for the 
full disclosure of the patented invention and its dedication to the public on the 
expiration of the patent.”67 
There are, of course, two ways this “bargain” can be characterized.68 On 
one view, the bargain is simply a grant of a number of years of protection in 
exchange for the disclosure of the invention to the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (and thus, upon publication, to the world). When the disclosure has 
occurred and the years have run, each party has fulfilled its obligations under 
the agreement. On another view, however, the patentee’s consideration is two-
fold: in exchange for the limited monopoly, the patentee must not only disclose 
the invention to the public but also agree to forego any other legal rights that 
might attach to the invention as against the public after the expiration of the 
term. The latter view thus works as a doctrine of election of sorts, in that it tells 
the patentee that if it elects to participate in the patent system, it is giving up the 
right to assert other intellectual property rights as against the public after the 
patent term expires; it has, put differently, given the public an unfettered “right 
to copy” the subject matter of the patent.69 
Two related aspects of this argument merit closer consideration. First, we 
might query whether the quid pro quo argument has the same force in the 
 
appropriate the discovery without paying the stipulated consideration. 
Id. at 244; see also Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (patent law “was 
passed for the purpose of encouraging useful invention and promoting new and useful 
improvements by the protection and stimulation thereby given to inventive genius, and was 
intended to secure to the public, after the lapse of the exclusive privileges granted, the 
benefit of such inventions and improvements”). 
 67.  326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945); see also id. at 256 (“By the force of the patent laws not 
only is the invention of a patent dedicated to the public upon its expiration, but the public 
thereby becomes entitled to share in the good will which the patentee has built up in the 
patented article or product through the enjoyment of his patent monopoly. Hence we have 
held that the patentee may not exclude the public from participating in that good will or 
secure, to any extent, a continuation of his monopoly by resorting to the trademark law and 
registering as a trademark any particular descriptive matter appearing in the specifications, 
drawings, or claims of the expired patent, whether or not such matter describes essential 
elements of the invention or claims.”). 
 68.  Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.: 
Breakfast with Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220, 247 n.92 (Jane C. 
Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (discussing various theories as to the 
“terms and conditions of the bargain”). 
 69.  Cf. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“The right to copy is even more robust when the copied product was previously patented 
but the patent has expired. In that case, the original producer has reaped his reward of a 17-
year monopoly and the public has already ‘paid the congressionally mandated price for 
disclosure.’” (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 
(1989))). 
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courts as applied to copyright and design patents, both of which also involve 
limited monopolies for a set term. In its 2003 opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the 
Court agreed to “demur” to the description of the Copyright Clause as 
empowering Congress to enact a bargain through copyright legislation.70 But 
the Court’s view of that bargain in Eldred entailed the claim that that past 
authors would benefit from any extensions of copyright granted to future 
authors; it did not strongly support the view that the “copyright bargain” was 
between authors and the public. To the contrary, the Court noted that “our 
references to a quid pro quo typically appear in the patent context,” in which 
disclosure of the invention is the quo exchanged for the quid of patent 
protection.71 By contrast, the Court suggested, because no disclosure is 
required as a condition of securing copyright, the case for any quid pro quo in 
the copyright context is weaker. Copyright law may be justified by the ultimate 
goal of disseminating works of authorship to the public, but since the move in 
the 1976 Copyright Act from publication to fixation as the triggering event for 
protection, the diary tucked away in a desk drawer receives just as much 
protection as the best-selling novel. Thus, there is now nothing beyond creation 
that the author need do in order to receive copyright protection, and so 
whatever agreement exists cannot truly be characterized as “If you create for 
the public’s benefit, we will give you these rights.” Rather, the agreement is in 
the nature of a reward: “Whenever you create in a particular way, you will get 
these rights.” 
As with copyright, design patents are offered as incentive for creation, not 
disclosure or publication. Unlike with utility patents, the public does not need 
the patentee to explain how the invention works; the subject matter of a design 
patent is apparent to all who view the article. The goal of the design patent 
scheme, therefore, is to generate creative activity for the ultimate aesthetic 
benefit of the public, and the right is in the nature of a reward for so doing, 
although examination narrows the class of creators who may benefit.72   
Nevertheless, in a 1947 opinion, the Second Circuit took the view that the 
end of the design patent term worked a dedication of the design to the public 
domain.73 The plaintiff had brought suit against the defendant, alleging that the 
defendant’s sale of cologne in a particular bottle constituted unfair competition 
based on the plaintiff’s common law trademark rights in the shape of the bottle 
(what we would now term trade dress); the plaintiff had also held two design 
patents for the bottle shape that had since expired.74 The Second Circuit 
 
 70.  537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003). 
 71.  Id. at 216. 
 72.  See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1872) (“It is the 
appearance itself . . . no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if not 
entirely, the contribution to the public which the law deems worthy of recompense.”). 
 73.  See Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lander Co., Inc., 164 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1947). 
  74.  Id. at 396. 
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rejected the claim on the grounds that the plaintiff had shown neither secondary 
meaning nor confusion, but it went on to discuss approvingly the district 
court’s view that the plaintiff should not be allowed to assert trademark rights 
at all in light of the expired patent: 
A patent is the grant of a temporary monopoly to the patentee; at its expiration 
all are free to use the invention. During the life of the patent a purchaser will 
naturally associate the produce with the producer, since the patent prevents 
others from producing. But such association does not furnish justification for 
an extension of such protection unlimited in time. . . .What cases there are 
clearly indicate that the expiration of a design patent effects a dedication of 
that design to the public.75 
The court went on to distinguish material in the public domain that had never 
been patented, noting: “If in return for the statutory monopoly for a term the 
patentee is held thereafter to dedicate his invention to the public, it would 
naturally follow that where he has never had this monopoly he has nothing to 
give up.”76 This is therefore a strong version of the quid pro quo argument: If 
the plaintiff has taken advantage of the patent system, it agrees to cede trade 
dress rights; if it chooses to market the product without seeking a patent, it 
cedes the patent rights but not trade dress rights. 
But thirty years later, this view appeared to have changed. In In re Yardley, 
discussed earlier,77 the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals rejected the quid 
pro quo argument as a basis for denying concurrent design patent and copyright 
protection. “[T]he mere fact that the copyright will persist beyond the term of 
any design patent which may be granted,” the court held, “does not provide a 
sound basis for rejecting appellant’s design patent application.”78 Indeed, the 
court rejected the analogy to contract (through the use of the concept “failure of 
consideration”), noting that a patent should be governed by property principles, 
not by contract principles.79 The court took a similar view in its decision in In 
re Honeywell, Inc.80 the same year. In that case, Honeywell had appealed from 
the decision of the TTAB refusing registration of its thermostat configuration 
on the grounds that the configuration had been the subject matter of an expired 
design patent. The CCPA reversed, noting the “clear distinction between the 
underlying bases of the federal trademark and design patent laws”:  
[T]he public interest—protection from confusion, mistake, and deception in 
the purchase of goods and services—must prevail over any alleged extension 
of design patent rights, when a trademark is non-functional and does in fact 
serve as a means to distinguish the goods of the trademark owner from those 
 
  75.  Id. at 397-98 (citation omitted). 
 76.  Id. at 398. 
 77.  See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. 
 78.  In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
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of others.81 
This perspective highlights the second aspect of the “right to copy”/quid 
pro quo argument that merits further analysis. Even if we view patent law or 
copyright law as embodying a contractual agreement that once the term expires, 
the subject matter of the copyright or patent is dedicated to the public, we 
should be clear about what we mean by “subject matter.” The right to copy or 
use the inventive aspect of an article covered by a design patent or the creative 
aspect of a work of authorship covered by copyright does not necessarily entail 
a right to be free from trademark and unfair competition law’s requirement to 
avoid consumer confusion. The right to copy a pharmaceutical no longer under 
patent, for example, does not give the copier the right to label the drug in 
whatever manner it desires; likewise, the right to copy a painting no longer 
under copyright does not give the copier the right to unfettered access via 
breaking into a museum after hours to set up her easel. Indeed, this is the lesson 
with respect to unfair competition law specifically in a line of cases from the 
Court, all of which permit the competitor to copy the subject matter of an 
expired patent but impose an affirmative obligation on the competitor’s part to 
label its goods or otherwise make clear to consumers the source of 
manufacture. 
In Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., an 1896 case, the 
Supreme Court was faced with a number of sewing machines manufactured by 
the Singer Manufacturing Company on which the patent had expired.82 The 
defendant had manufactured virtually identical machines for sale and, in so 
doing, had not only called them “Singer” machines but had also copied certain 
of the labeling that the Singer company had used. The Court held, first, that the 
expiration of the patent meant that the defendant, like any member of the 
public, had the “right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent,” as it is 
“upon this condition that the patent is granted.”83 Second, the Court held that 
this grant to the public included not only the form of the object but also the 
generic name of the object, even if that name had been developed or invented 
by the former patent holder or was the surname of the patentee. “To say 
otherwise,” said the Court, “would be to hold that although the public had 
 
 81.  Id. at 1348. On remand, the TTAB held that the feature that Honeywell attempted 
to register was de jure functional; the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals affirmed that 
finding. In re Honeywell, Inc., 532 F.2d 180, 181 (C.C.P.A. 1976); see also Krueger Int’l, 
Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Sotomayor, J.) (“When a 
design patent expires, the design becomes copyable. It may not, however, be copied in such 
a way that customers are deceived about what they are buying.”), overruled on other 
grounds by Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.2d 373, 378 n.3 (2d Cir. 
1997). Notably, Krueger was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), that product design could not be 
inherently distinctive trade dress. 
 82.  163 U.S. 169, 169 (1896). 
 83.  Id. at 185. 
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acquired the device covered by the patent, yet the owner of the patent or the 
manufacturer of the patented thing had retained the designated name which was 
essentially necessary to vest the public with the full enjoyment of that which 
had become theirs by the disappearance of the monopoly.”84 However, the 
Court also held that the same public interest that supported the dedication of the 
formerly patented object to the public also supported the principle that such use 
carried a duty to take such precautions “as will protect the property of others 
and prevent injury to the public interest.”85 Thus, where the generic name also 
served as a trademark in some instances, the failure to clearly indicate the 
source of manufacture would be an improper act that would both harm the 
goodwill of the mark holder and risk deceiving the public. “[T]o compel,” the 
Court wrote, “the one who uses the name after the expiration of the patent, to 
indicate that the articles are made by himself, in no way impairs the right of 
use, but simply regulates and prevents wrong to individuals and injury to the 
public.”86 
In the case at hand, the Court held that while the defendant’s 
advertisements made clear that the machines it sold were from the June 
Manufacturing Company, the machines themselves did not contain sufficient 
notice of their source, both via acts of omission and via acts of commission. For 
example, the Court noted that an oval plate on the machines contained the 
words “Improved Singer” but did not contain anything to indicate that the 
machines were made by the defendant. Similarly, the Court highlighted that a 
marking on the legs of the stand contained the word “Singer” in bold with 
“I.S.” above and “J. Mfg. Co.” in small letters. “The similarity between the 
letter J. and the letter S., the failure to state in full the name of the 
manufacturer, the general resemblance to the device of the Singer Company, 
the place where it was put, which had no necessary connection with the 
structure or working capacity of the machines, and the prominence of the 
casting of the word ‘Singer’ in comparison with the other mark,” the Court 
noted, “bring out in the plainest way the purpose of suppressing knowledge of 
the actual manufacturer, and suggesting that it was made by the Singer 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 186. 
 86.  Id. at 187; see also id. at 199-200 (“[W]here, during the life of a monopoly created 
by a patent, a name, whether it be arbitrary or be that of the inventor, has become, by his 
consent, either express or tacit, the identifying and generic name of the thing patented, this 
name passes to the public with the cessation of the monopoly which the patent created. 
Where another avails himself of this public dedication to make the machine and use the 
generic designation, he can do so in all forms, with the fullest liberty, by affixing such name 
to the machines, by referring to it in advertisements and by other means, subject, however, to 
the condition that the name must be so used as not to deprive others of their rights or to 
deceive the public, and, therefore, that the name must be accompanied with such indications 
that the thing manufactured is the work of the one making it, as will unmistakably inform the 
public of that fact.”). 
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Company.”87 Thus, concluded the Court, because the defendant had the right to 
use the word “Singer,” “it is plain that the infringement only resulted from the 
failure to plainly state along with the use of that word the source of 
manufacture.”88 The Court reversed and remanded, with directions to enter an 
injunction enjoining the defendant from using the word Singer “without clearly 
and unmistakably stating in all said advertisements that the machines are made 
by the defendant, as distinguished from the sewing machines made by the 
Singer Manufacturing Company.”89 
In a companion case decided the same day,90 the Court held that although 
the defendant was legally permitted to sell the sewing machines at issue and to 
use the name Singer in doing so, he could not engage in other activity that 
would likely deceive consumers into believing that the machines were made by 
the Singer Manufacturing Company, such as including a brass plate with the 
lettering “New York S.M. Mfg. Co.” that resembled Singer’s own brass 
plates.91 The Court thus reversed the order of the lower court in the defendant’s 
favor and remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of Singer, 
enjoining the defendant from  
marking upon sewing machines made or sold by him, or upon any plate or 
device connected therewith or attached thereto, the word ‘Singer,” or words or 
letters equivalent thereto, without clearly and unmistakably specifying in 
connection therewith that such machines are the product of the defendant or 
other manufacturer, and not the manufacture of the Singer Manufacturing 
Company.92  
In both Singer cases, then, the Court suggested that even though the defendants 
were availing themselves of the right to use what had then become a generic 
term—a word that, essentially, the defendants had a “right to copy”—they 
could not do so without taking additional steps to minimize consumer 
confusion in the marketplace. 
One might argue that the Singer cases do not truly implicate any limitations 
on the “right to copy,” since the apparent consumer confusion emanated only 
from the use of the word “Singer” and not from the shape of the formerly 
patented machines. But Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,93 in which the 
Court considered an unfair competition suit brought by National Biscuit 
 
 87.  Id. at 201. 
 88.  Id. at 204. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Singer Mfg. Co. v. Bent, 163 U.S. 205 (1896). 
 91.  Id. at 206 (“It is plain that the position and size as well as the inscription found on 
these devices were calculated to deceive by creating the impression, on one not familiar with 
all the details of the marks of the Singer Manufacturing Company, that they were the marks 
of that company.”). 
 92.  Id. at 207. 
 93.  305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
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Company against Kellogg Company over Kellogg’s sale of shredded wheat 
breakfast cereal in the form of a pillow-shaped biscuit, provides more context 
in this regard. The process of manufacturing shredded wheat had previously 
been protected by a utility patent and the pillow shape by a design patent; the 
utility patent had expired and the design patent was declared invalid one year 
before its expiration.94 Accordingly, Kellogg argued that it had the right not 
only to manufacture cereal in a pillow-shaped form but also to call it “shredded 
wheat,” the term that National Biscuit Company had been using. National 
Biscuit Company did not deny that Kellogg had the right to use the formerly 
patented process but alleged that both the pillow-shaped form and the term 
“shredded wheat” continued to have trademark significance and that Kellogg’s 
use constituted passing off.95 The Court, citing Singer v. June, held that when 
the patent expired on the process of making shredded wheat, the generic 
designation of the patented product also passed to the public.96 Nevertheless, 
the Court continued, the fact that some residual association between the term 
and the plaintiff might exist—what we today would call de facto secondary 
meaning—entitled the plaintiff to demand that the defendant “use reasonable 
care to inform the public of the source of its product.”97 This would have been 
true even if Kellogg had not used the term “shredded wheat” but had availed 
itself only of the right to copy the biscuit shape: “Kellogg Company was free to 
use the pillow-shaped form, subject only to the obligation to identify its product 
lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.”98 And this the Court held that 
Kellogg had done: Given that virtually all of Kellogg’s shredded wheat was 
sold to consumer in cartons, which were clearly marked with the Kellogg name, 
Kellogg had indeed taken reasonable care to prevent consumer confusion, even 
if some small degree of confusion might remain.99 
What are now known as the Sears/Compco cases make the point even more 
starkly: Even when patent law grants the right to copy an article, a court may 
require additional labeling, disclaimers, or other statements pursuant to unfair 
competition law to mitigate consumer confusion. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Stiffel Co., decided in 1964, Stiffel brought suit against Sears for infringement 
of Stiffel’s utility and design patents on a pole lamp and for state unfair 
competition, on the grounds that by selling a substantially identical lamp, Sears 
had confused consumers as to the source of the lamp.100 The district court held 
the patent invalid for lack of invention, a ruling that was not challenged on 
 
 94.  Id. at 119 n.4. 
  95.  Id. at 116. 
 96.  Id. at 117. 
 97.  Id. at 118-19 (“The only obligation resting upon Kellogg Company was to identify 
its own product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.”). 
 98.  Id. at 120. 
  99.  Id. at 120-22. 
 100.  376 U.S. 225, 225-26 (1964). 
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appeal, so the question was whether the sale of an object substantially similar to 
an unpatented item could be the basis of an unfair competition claim.101 In 
holding that it could not, the Court was concerned with using state unfair 
competition law as an end-run around the federal patent laws. Federal patent 
law, the Court held, embodies a congressional policy of “granting patents only 
to true inventions, and then only for a limited time,” after which the “right to 
make the article—including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried 
when patented—passes to the public.”102 Thus, a suit based on nothing more 
than the identical appearance of the two lamps was an impermissible patent 
suit, not an unfair competition suit, but a state “may, in appropriate 
circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled 
or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being 
misled as to the source [of the goods].”103 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., was decided the same day to the same effect.104 
Two related aspects of the Court’s opinions in Sears/Compco are worth 
highlighting. First, the Court was careful to note the different purposes and 
goals of the different intellectual property regimes: patent law governs the right 
to make the patented article, while unfair competition law governs source 
identification. Second, the Court was sensitive to the attempt to circumvent the 
boundaries of one intellectual property regime by denominating the claim as 
something else. The state claim at issue, although characterized as an unfair 
competition claim, was in reality an attempt to prevent the copying of the lamp, 
full stop, and thus was really a patent-like claim. 
Both of these aspects were present in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc.,105 decided in 1989. In that case, the Court considered the validity 
of a Florida statute enacted in 1983 that made it unlawful to “use the direct 
molding process to duplicate for the purpose of sale any manufactured vessel 
hull or component part of a vessel made by another without the written 
permission of that other person.”106 The plaintiff company, which had 
marketed a successful hull design for over seven years without patent 
protection, filed suit under the statute in 1984, alleging that the defendant had 
unlawfully duplicated its hull design. The defendant argued that the statute was 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it 
conflicted with federal patent law, in that it provided patent-like protection to 
 
   101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 230-31. 
 103.  Id. at 232. 
 104.  376 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964) (“And of course a State cannot hold a copier 
accountable in damages for failure to label or otherwise to identify his goods unless his 
failure is in violation of valid state statutory or decisional law requiring the copier to label or 
take other precautions to prevent confusion of customers as to the source of the goods.”). 
 105.  489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 106.  Id. at 144-45 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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an article that, because it had already been marketed to the public without 
protection, was in the public domain and so was free to be copied.107 The 
Supreme Court agreed, holding that “state regulation of intellectual property 
must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in 
our patent laws.”108 Since federal law mandates that the subject matter of an 
expired patent (or subject matter that was never patented) be free to copy, 
Florida’s statute to the contrary was preempted.109  
The Court’s holding relied on three intellectual steps. First, the Court’s 
characterization of federal law depended on a quid pro quo argument. The 
limited term of the patent is offered in exchange for disclosure of the invention 
to the public; thus, there is no agreement, and federal patent law does not 
prevent copying, where the subject matter has already been disclosed to the 
market or the patent term has expired.110 Second, state law interferes with this 
determination when it provides patent-like protection to unprotectable subject 
matter, even if the statute is in name an unfair competition law.111 The Florida 
statute, for example, was not limited to instances of consumer confusion or 
passing off; it was “aimed directly at preventing the exploitation of the design 
and utilitarian conceptions embodied in the product itself” in order to induce 
improvement in boat hull designs.112 And finally, as in the cases already 
discussed, the Court noted that the states were free to offer limited protection—
such as protection against consumer confusion as to source—that did not 
interfere with the federal patent scheme.113 
The case law just recounted holds that the “right to copy” afforded by 
patent law and copyright is just that: a right to copy the subject matter that was 
formerly the subject of patent or copyright protection, but not a freedom from 
additional requirements necessary to remedy unfair competition violations. 
Two more recent cases, however—TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, 
 
   107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 152. 
 109.  Id. 
   110.  See id. at 150-51 (“The federal patent system . . . embodies a carefully crafted 
bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances 
in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a 
period of years.”); id. at 156 (“[W]e have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears and 
Compco that ideas once placed before the public without the protection of a valid patent are 
subject to appropriation without significant restraint.”). 
 111.  Id. at 157 (“It is readily apparent that the Florida statute does not operate to 
prohibit ‘unfair competition’ in the usual sense that the term is understood.”). 
 112.  Id. at 158; see also id. at 160 (“In essence, the Florida law prohibits the entire 
public from engaging in a form of reverse engineering of a product in the public domain. 
This is clearly one of the rights vested in the federal patent holder, but has never been a part 
of state protection under the law of unfair competition or trade secrets.”). 
 113.  See id. at 166-67 (noting that the very existence of section 43 of the Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), indicates Congress’s recognition that unfair competition law and patent 
law can coexist). 
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Inc.,114 and Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.115—must be 
distinguished. Like the earlier cases, TrafFix involved an unfair competition 
suit against a competitor who copied the subject matter of an expired patent (a 
dual-spring stand for outdoor road signs).116 The Court likewise ruled in favor 
of the defendant, but beyond noting that the defendant was not required to hide 
from public view the technology it copied,117 the Court did not consider any 
affirmative obligation on the defendant’s part to dispel consumer confusion. 
This omission, however, was not surprising, since the focus in TrafFix was on 
evidentiary, not doctrinal matters. As the case involved the “well-established 
rule that trade dress protection may not be claimed for product features that are 
functional,”118 the question before the Court was whether the plaintiff had 
satisfied its burden to show that the dual-spring mechanism for which it 
claimed trade dress protection was not functional. Indeed, the Court specifically 
declined to accept suggestions from TrafFix and two of its supporting amici 
that the Court rest its holding on the patent bargain’s “right to copy” that 
provided the foundation for the Court’s holding in Singer v. June.119 
Dastar, by contrast, did specifically invoke the quid pro quo of Sears and 
Kellogg. At issue in the case was a television series that was no longer under 
copyright and thus was free for all to copy. The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant’s marketing of the series on videotape under its own name 
constituted unfair competition (in the form of reverse passing off).120 Recalling 
the line of cases just discussed, the Court held, not surprisingly, that the 
defendant was free to copy the formerly protected work.121 But it also added, 
contrary to those cases, that the defendant had no obligation to engage in 
labeling that would lessen consumer confusion as to the source of manufacture, 
assuming that the source for a communicative good is the author of the work. 
Indeed, the Court held, to require any such labeling would “create a species of 
mutant copyright law that limits the public’s ‘federal right to ‘copy and to use’ 
expired copyrights.’”122 
 
 114.  532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 115.  539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 116.  532 U.S. at 25-26. 
 117.  Id. at 34. 
 118.  Id. at 29. 
 119.  Id. at 35 (“If, despite the rule that functional features may not be the subject of 
trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of 
an expired utility patent, that will be time enough to consider the matter.”). 
 120.  Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26-27. 
 121.  Id. at 33-34, 38. 
 122.  Id. at 34 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
165 (1989)); see also id. at 33 (“The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a 
copyright has expired, like ‘the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—passes to the 
public.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 
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Contrary to the cases just discussed, Dastar involved a communicative or 
intellectual product rather than a physical one; as a result, it presents 
complicated and different questions of copying and production.123 As noted, 
however, each of the previous cases held that mandating limited relief under 
the Lanham Act would not interfere with the right to copy formerly protected 
material; indeed, Kellogg characterized reasonable efforts to eliminate 
consumer confusion under those circumstances as an obligation.124 But because 
of the particular facts of Dastar, its posture as a reverse passing off case, and 
the sweeping nature of its holding, the Court had no need to inquire into the 
effect on consumers of the defendant’s existing labeling.125 Thus, despite 
Dastar’s broad characterization of the case law on which it relied, its holding 
should be seen as dependent on the particular circumstances in that case and 
not as a complete repudiation of the precedent holding that the right to copy 
does not absolve one of the obligation to minimize consumer confusion.126 
What is important to recognize about TrafFix and Dastar, however, is the 
likely reason that the Court in those cases suggested (if only by omission in 
TrafFix) that the defendant had no obligation even to consider unfair 
competition principles. In both cases, the plaintiff was characterized as a bad 
 
230 (1964))). 
 123.  In other words, although the defendant in Kellogg was permitted, once the patent 
no longer pertained, to do what patent law formerly prohibited—making and selling the 
article without prior authorization—unfair competition law might still have required some 
labeling as to the fact that it was the defendant, and not the plaintiff, that was doing it. See 
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938). Analogously, the defendant in 
Dastar was permitted, once the copyright expired, to do what copyright law formerly 
prohibited: making decisions about how the work would be used and distributed (questions 
of fair use and other defenses aside). Similarly, then, unfair competition law might still have 
required the defendant to engage in labeling to inform consumers that it, and not the 
plaintiff, was responsible for those decisions. The fact that Dastar was a reverse passing-off 
case, and not a traditional passing-off case, complicates the analogy. 
 124.  See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120; see also, e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded 
Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding that 
where the defendant uses the same generic term as the plaintiff, “the subsequent competitor 
cannot be prevented from using the generic term to denote itself or its product, but it may be 
enjoined from passing itself or its product off as the first organization or its product. Thus, a 
court may require the competitor to take whatever steps are necessary to distinguish itself or 
its product from the first organization or its product,” and proceeding to cite cases). 
 125.  Part of the difficulty is that the previous cases concerned claims of passing off, 
where the defendant’s obligation could consist merely of affirmatively identifying itself as 
the manufacturer of the goods. The Dastar Court’s concern in the reverse passing off case at 
issue there was that it would be difficult to determine what an appropriate disclosure should 
look like. The Court resolved these practical difficulties by interpreting “origin of goods” in 
section 43(a) to refer to the physical good (the videotape), not the communicative content it 
contained, thus rendering Dastar’s representation of source not misleading. 539 U.S. at 
35-37. 
 126.  For a thoughtful consideration of Dastar’s implications at the copyright/trademark 
interface, see Mark P. McKenna, Dastar’s Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357 (2012). 
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actor, attempting to use unfair competition law to achieve a patent- or 
copyright-related goal that was unavailable under those doctrines. In arguing as 
counsel for TrafFix at the Court, now-Justice Roberts framed the issue in the 
case as follows: 
 But then MDI’s patents expired, as under the Constitution all patents 
eventually must. Sometime thereafter, TrafFix Devices, the petitioner, copied 
MDI’s stand, added some improvements of its own, and marketed a competing 
version. No longer armed with its patents, MDI tried a new tack to exclude 
competition. It claimed that the configuration of its stand, the same dual-
spring design that it had touted as patent-protected during the term of the 
patents, was protected as trade dress and could not be copied.127 
Similarly, Twentieth-Century Fox, the plaintiff in Dastar, was almost certainly 
trying to make up for the failure to renew the copyright in the work at issue, 
which failure had allowed the work to fall into the public domain in the first 
place. Indeed, the Second Circuit has read TrafFix and Dastar in precisely this 
way, noting that these cases suggest the general principle “that intellectual 
property owners should not be permitted to recategorize one form of 
intellectual property as another, thereby extending the duration of protection 
beyond that which Congress deemed appropriate for their actual creative 
efforts . . . .”128 
Thus, we see in the Court’s jurisprudence two related principles. First, 
there is no general bar to asserting one category of intellectual property claims 
even when another category would permit the defendant’s activity. The fact 
that patent law would permit the defendant to copy the subject matter at issue 
does not mean that the defendant might not also be required, in appropriate 
circumstances, to label the article so as to make its source clear. (We must 
obviously count Dastar as an exception to this principle at the 
copyright/trademark interface, despite its inconsistency with precedent.) 
Second, courts are (and, I will argue, should be) attentive to instances in which 
the assertion of a claim is remote from the interest at the heart of the doctrine at 
issue. Where the courts sense that plaintiffs are attempting an end-run around 
the limitations of a particular legal doctrine, they often prevent those plaintiffs 
from continuing to assert their claims. I discuss this phenomenon—which is 
typically termed “misuse” in the intellectual property realm—in the next 
Subpart. 
 
 127.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 
532 U.S. 23 (2001), (No. 99-1571), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov 
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/99-1571.pdf. 
 128.  Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005); 
see also IQ Group, Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ’g, LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592-93 (D.N.J. 2006) 
(rejecting interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)’s reference to “copyright management 
information” to include company logo on the grounds that plaintiff “should not be permitted 
to recategorize its mark so as to invoke copyright protection”). 
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C. Overlapping Rights and Remedies129 
Originally existing as an equitable doctrine only in patent law, the viability 
of the misuse doctrine in copyright law has since been well established, albeit 
not in every federal circuit.130 In both intellectual property areas, the doctrine 
derives from the “unclean hands” principle used as an equitable backstop in 
many areas of law. The justification is, generally, that a plaintiff who has taken 
the benefit of the public grant provided by copyright and/or patent law should 
not be allowed to enforce the limited monopoly in court when, as against the 
defendant in the case or as against other entities, it has overreached in 
exercising those rights.131 
The case typically identified as the landmark patent misuse doctrine is 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,132 in which the Court held that the 
holder of a patent on a salt-depositing machine could not assert its patent 
against an alleged infringer where the patent holder had required licensees to 
 
 129.  The following three paragraphs are largely taken from Heymann, supra note 22, at 
90-93. 
 130.  The doctrine has been recognized by courts in almost every circuit (some 
expressly, some more hypothetically). See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., 
Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home 
Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204-06 (3d Cir. 2003); Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. 
WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 
166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 
516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973-77 (4th Cir. 
1990); United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610-12 (8th Cir. 1988); 
Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc., No. 03 CIV 9944 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26143, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005); Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review, Inc., 
332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17-20 (D.D.C. 2004); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 114 F. 
Supp. 2d 1070, 1113-14 (D. Kan. 2000). 
The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits remain more equivocal. See Garcia-Goyco v. 
Law Envtl. Consultants, Inc., 428 F.3d 14, 21 n.7 (1st Cir. 2005) (“This court has not yet 
recognized misuse of a copyright as a defense to infringement.”); Telecom Tech. Servs. v. 
Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 831 (11th Cir. 2004) (avoiding decision as to whether to recognize 
a copyright misuse defense); Microsoft Corp. v. Compusource Distribs., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 
2d 800, 810 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (finding that defendants had failed to raise a material issue of 
fact with respect to copyright misuse). 
 131.  See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Daniel Moylan, The Evolving Doctrine of 
Copyright Misuse, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 269, 269 (Peter 
Yu ed., 2007); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1113 
(2003); Ralph D. Clifford, Simultaneous Copyright and Trade Secret Claims: Can the 
Copyright Misuse Defense Prevent Constitutional Doublethink?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 247, 287 
(2000); Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming 
Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 514 
(2004); Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and 
First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1304-07 (1991); Kathryn Judge, Note, 
Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 904 (2004); David Scher, Note, The 
Viability of the Copyright Misuse Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 101 (1993). 
 132.  314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
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use its machine only in conjunction with the patent holder’s (unpatented) salt 
tablets.133 Equitable considerations should bar the patent infringement suit, the 
Court held, because the patent monopoly is granted as a “special privilege” that 
includes as an unstated term the obligation to assert that privilege only in a 
manner consistent with public policy—specifically, the exclusion from the 
patent grant of anything not included with the patented invention.134 Thus, a 
patentee that uses its monopoly in the patented article to acquire a monopoly in 
an unpatented article should be forbidden from enforcing its patent at all until 
the misuse ends. 
Courts have on occasion deployed the misuse doctrine to prevent copyright 
owners from asserting copyright in ways that seem far removed from the 
economic interests traditionally seen to be at the core of copyright law, even 
when antitrust interests are not at stake, as they were in Morton Salt.135 For 
example, in Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., a 2011 decision, the 
plaintiff luxury watchmaker engraved a small design on the reverse side of its 
watches in order to be able to assert that the unauthorized importation of those 
watches by a discount store constituted copyright infringement.136 The court 
granted summary judgment on the infringement claim to the defendant, holding 
that Omega misused its copyright in the design in order to control the 
importation of the watches.137 
We might also characterize as motivated by misuse-like considerations the 
instances in which courts push back against perceived end-runs around 
doctrinal limitations. One example from outside the intellectual property realm 
is Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.138 The Reverend Jerry Falwell, a nationally 
known minister who often commented on public issues, brought suit against 
Hustler Magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt. The suit was over a parody 
advertisement on the inside front cover of the November 1983 issue of the 
 
 133.  Id. at 492. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See, e.g., Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC, 350 F.3d at 647 (contending that the 
doctrine is appropriate where a plaintiff uses a copyright infringement suit to obtain property 
protection (for example, in data) “that copyright law clearly does not confer”); Video 
Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 205-06 (asserting that the doctrine is potentially appropriate where the 
copyright holder uses an infringement suit “to restrict expression that is critical of it”) 
(dicta); Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 131, at 274 (noting that courts have used the 
copyright misuse doctrine “to reinforce subject matter limitations and channeling doctrines 
that maintain boundaries”); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and 
Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 
124 (1997). Relatedly, Dan Burk articulates an additional function for misuse: “preserving 
the courts from the reputational damage of enforcing legal claims that might be technically 
legitimate but which would lead to socially perverse outcomes.” Burk, supra note 131, at 
1133. 
 136.  No. CV 04-05443 TJH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155893, at *1-3 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 137.  Id. at *4. 
 138.  485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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magazine. Based on ads for Campari Liqueur that featured celebrities talking 
about their “first time” (the meaning was the first time they had tried Campari, 
although the double entendre was surely obvious), the parody ad had Falwell 
stating that his “first time” was “during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with 
his mother in an outhouse.”139 In his complaint, Falwell alleged that the ad 
constituted an invasion of privacy, libel, and an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The district court directed a verdict in Hustler’s favor on the 
privacy claim, and the jury found for the magazine on the defamation claim, 
concluding that the ad could not reasonably be understood to state actual facts; 
the jury found for Falwell on the emotional distress claim.140 The issue before 
the Court, then, was whether the First Amendment limitations applicable to the 
defamation claim after Times v. Sullivan,141 based on Falwell’s position as a 
public figure, would apply equally to the emotional distress claim based on the 
same material. In holding that such limitations did apply, the Court focused on 
the public interest in engaging in debate about public affairs and the “breathing 
room” necessary to afford free debate that motivated the rule in Times v. 
Sullivan, an interest that would be thwarted if public figures could evade First 
Amendment limitations by changing the name of their claim.142 
Another example is Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, in 
which the Seventh Circuit, having reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff 
corporation’s count alleging defamation based on a television broadcast, 
affirmed the dismissal of the count alleging wrongful interference with business 
relations based on the same broadcast.143 The court noted that “[a]ny libel of 
corporation can be made to resemble in a general way this archetypal wrongful-
interference case,” in that the allegation would be that the defamation caused 
customers to stop doing business with it.144 But the court saw such allegations 
as an attempt to evade the limitations attendant to defamation doctrine, noting 
in particular that it was evident that the plaintiff did not believe that the 
broadcaster had any intent other than to increase viewership and so could not 
truly articulate the kind of harm that underlies a wrongful interference claim.145 
One final example (perhaps not coincidentally, also from the Seventh 
 
 139.  Id. at 48. 
   140.  Id. at 48-49. 
 141.  The Court had held in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that 
in order for a public figure to recover for the harm caused by a defamatory falsehood, he or 
she had to show that the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 280. 
 142.  Falwell, 485 U.S. at 53-56. 
 143.  Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273-74 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
   144.   Id. at 273. 
   145.   Id. at 273-74. 
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Circuit) is J.H. Desnick, M.D. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.146 
Desnick involved an ophthalmic clinic and two of its doctors who brought suit 
against a television network and others over an undercover report that claimed 
that the clinic performed unnecessary cataract surgery on its patients. The 
plaintiffs brought suit primarily for defamation, based on the content of the 
broadcast, and for trespass, on the grounds that the plaintiffs would never have 
granted permission to the undercover reporters (who were posing as patients) 
had their true motives been known.147 After holding that the lower court 
improperly dismissed the defamation claim,148 the Seventh Circuit held that, by 
contrast, the trespass claim was properly dismissed. The harm allegedly 
suffered by the plaintiffs—a reputational harm based on the accusations in the 
broadcast—was a defamation-type harm. That harm might have been facilitated 
by the entry onto the plaintiff’s property, but the plaintiffs were not truly 
complaining about an injury to the inviolability of their land ownership.149 (We 
can assume that the plaintiffs would not have complained if the television 
broadcast had been favorable, even though such a broadcast would have 
resulted from the same unauthorized entrance onto the plaintiffs’ property.)150 
Put otherwise, in the Seventh Circuit’s words, “[t]here was no invasion in the 
present case of any of the specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks to 
protect.”151 The upshot of these cases, then, is not a conclusion that the plaintiff 
has no emotional distress, interference with business relations, or trespass rights 
to assert whatsoever; rather, it is a determination that the nature of the harm 
asserted in the cases at hand did not align with those interests.152 
 
 146.  44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). Perhaps also not coincidentally, both the Brown & 
Williamson opinion and the Desnick opinion were authored by Judge Posner. 
   147.   Id. at 1347-49. 
   148.   See id. at 1351. 
   149.   Id. at 1352-53. 
 150.   As Saul Levmore points out, a positive story was not likely one that the network 
would have had an interest in broadcasting. Saul Levmore, Judging Deception, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1779, 1786 (2007). 
 151.   J.H. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 
F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), yielded a different result but that result is reconcilable. Food Lion 
also involved undercover reporting by a news organization; the plaintiff also brought a claim 
for trespass, among other things. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of trespass 
(and award of $1.00 in nominal damages) based on the fact that the reporters, who had posed 
as employees, breached their duty of loyalty by secretly taping in nonpublic areas. Id. at 518. 
Although the cases are not cleanly distinguishable, it is easier to conclude that the plaintiff’s 
objection was to the presence of reporters in nonpublic areas, not simply the nature of what 
was said about the reporters’ observations afterwards. Additionally, the court made clear that 
the plaintiff could not, under Hustler v. Falwell, collect defamation-type damages under the 
state law claims without the application of First Amendment principles. Id. at 523. 
 152.   See J.H. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355 (investigative newsgathering “is entitled to all 
the safeguards with which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defamation. And it 
is entitled to them regardless of the name of the tort . . . .”); see also Berghoff v. R.J. Frisby 
Mfg. Co., 720 F. Supp. 649, 656 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[T]he fact that similar damages are 
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This case law suggests that one solution to the overlap problem in 
intellectual property law, including overlaps involving design patents, is not to 
require the rights holder to elect one form of protection at the outset but rather 
to encourage courts to be attentive to end-runs by calibrating remedies to the 
nature of the harm incurred.153 How then might courts go about determining 
whether the plaintiff is engaging in an end-run? The cases offer some 
suggestions. First, courts might attempt to divine the nature of the harm that the 
plaintiff seeks to remedy, in part by considering the course of conduct or 
litigation history. The Omega case is one such example, in which the court’s 
consideration of Omega’s course of conduct led it to the conclusion that Omega 
had brought an impermissible trademark infringement suit dressed in copyright 
infringement clothing.154 Second, courts might look at the relationship between 
the right asserted and the remedy sought. For example, if the plaintiff is 
bringing suit for infringement of trade dress where a design patent exists or has 
expired, a court should assess the viability of limited injunctive relief, such as a 
disclaimer or label, before considering broader, patent-like remedies, such as an 
injunction against distribution.155 
As an example, consider the dispute in Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 
mentioned earlier.156 Kohler and Moen are competitors in the field of faucets 
and faucet handles. Moen successfully obtained trade dress registration for the 
shape of some of its faucets, based on what the court characterized as 
 
recoverable for different torts indicates that the nature of the injury, not the types of damages 
recoverable, determines the cause of action and, consequently, the appropriate statute of 
limitations.” (footnote omitted)); Aequitron Med., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 704, 710 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (tortious interference with prospective business relationship claim); Evans 
v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 601 A.2d 330, 333 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“[W]here the underlying 
wrong which the complaint alleges is defamation by publication of a libelous report, and the 
claim of injury set out in each count springs from the act of publication, the Appellants 
should not be able to circumvent the statute of limitations by merely terming the claim 
tortious interference when in essence it is one of defamation, subject to a one year limitation 
of action. In such a situation, we will look to the gravamen of the action, not to the label 
applied to it by plaintiffs.”) 
 153.  Cf. David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent—The Dilemma of Confusion, 30 
RUTGERS L.J. 289, 306 (1999) (“It is not the function of trademark to protect designers 
against copying per se. Properly understood, the function of trademark law is to protect the 
reputation of the mark owner and to provide accurate information to potential purchasers.”). 
 154.  See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV 04-05443 TJH, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 155893), at *1  (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A]fter [dealers authorized by Omega] in the 
United States complained to Omega about Costco’s sale of Omega watches at discounted 
prices, Omega’s legal department suggested that Omega use a copyrighted design to control 
the importation and distribution of its watches into the United States.”). 
 155.  Dratler, supra note 28, at 935 n.237 (“The point is that protection under trademark 
principles does not remove an industrial design or product configuration from the public 
domain but merely proscribes those methods of copying it that unfairly usurp the originator’s 
goodwill.”). 
 156.  See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
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“substantial evidence” that purchasers recognized the faucets as Moen faucets 
due to their distinctive shape alone, without any additional markings.157 Kohler 
challenged the registration on the grounds, inter alia, that a product shape 
should not be able to be registered as trade dress under the Lanham Act because 
the potentially unlimited term of trade dress protection would directly conflict 
with the limited term awarded to configurations under design patent law, which 
was, in Kohler’s view, the proper protective regime in this case. The Seventh 
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that design patent law and trademark 
law were directed toward different ends and required different evidence in 
order to take advantage of the rights provided. Accordingly, the court 
concluded, “Kohler is free to copy Moen’s design so long as it insures that the 
public is not thereby deceived or confused into believing that its copy is a 
Moen faucet.”158 
Assume, then, that Moen had obtained a design patent for the ornamental 
aspects of its faucet; assume further that the patent had expired, and that Kohler 
then wanted to copy the design. One pragmatic objection to the court’s 
statement would be that Moen would likely argue that the mere copying of the 
design is likely to confuse consumers into believing that the Kohler faucet is a 
Moen faucet, given the distinctiveness that the Moen faucet acquired during the 
design patent term. Moreover, the argument would continue, the fact that the 
Kohler faucet would be sold in packaging clearly indicating the source of the 
faucet would not be sufficient to remedy any post-sale confusion arising once 
the faucets were installed. (Indeed, the post-sale confusion doctrine complicates 
things considerably, and courts would be well advised to reconsider its scope, if 
not its viability.)159 Here, therefore, is where it would be incumbent on courts 
to calibrate remedies particularly carefully. Kohler would be free, upon the 
expiration of the design patent, to copy the formerly patented design, and any 
request by Moen for an injunction to cease sales of the design should be denied. 
But Kellogg and similar cases suggest that Kohler has an affirmative obligation 
to take reasonable steps to minimize confusion. If a likelihood of confusion is 
shown, Kohler need not, after TrafFix, change or conceal the design in some 
way, but perhaps it might be directed to add a small marking directly to the 
faucet that indicates that the faucet is a Kohler faucet and not a Moen faucet. 
This seems to be an appropriate way to balance Kohler’s right to compete in the 
 
 157.  Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 158.  Id. at 640 n.10. 
 159.  Dratler, supra note 28, at 970 (“Taken together, the trends toward increasing 
recognition of post-sale confusion and greater emphasis on confusion as to sponsorship or 
affiliation may make it more difficult to frame and enforce commercially effective, and not 
merely token, disclaimers of affiliation when a copyist borrows an innovator’s design 
features.”); Welkowitz, supra note 153, at 329 (“Post-sale confusion stretches trademark law 
beyond consumer protection to openly protecting designs from the act of copying, i.e., as 
ordinary intellectual property, rather than unfair competition.”). 
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market for attractive faucet designs with the consumer’s interest in having 
accurate information as to the manufacturer of such designs.160 
To be sure, there are administrative costs involved in such an approach. It 
would be faster and less expensive to require intellectual property owners to 
elect only one form of protection at the front end. But implementing such a 
proposal would require a major overhaul of U.S. intellectual property law. 
Being more attentive to the relationship among rights, harms, and remedies is 
something that courts are well equipped and—as the cases above suggest—
even inclined to do. It reminds us that adjudication is, at its core, about 
providing appropriate remedies for legally cognizable harm. In order to 
accomplish that goal effectively, courts should not consider themselves to be 
limited by the labels plaintiffs apply to their claims. Rather, courts should 
consider the underlying nature of the harm asserted; only then can they identify 
the remedy best designed to ameliorate that harm.  
CONCLUSION 
Courts and commentators are not wrong to focus attention on doctrinal 
overlaps in intellectual property law. While it is true that such overlaps seem to 
be the result of congressional intention (at least implicitly), such that 
eliminating such overlaps as a structural matter would be inadvisable, the 
adjudication of overlaps in any particular case is the natural role of the courts. 
By ensuring that the gravamen of a claim, and not its label, is what drives any 
potential remedy, the effect of these overlaps in practice can be mitigated. 
As design patents continue to play more of a role in intellectual property 
law, the overlap question is likely to arise more frequently, particularly given 
that design patents feature the shortest (stated) term of all intellectual property 
doctrines. It may well be then, that it will be a design patent case that focuses 
our attention on the core goals of the various intellectual property doctrines and 
helps to highlight the challenges that come with ever-expanding doctrinal 
boundaries. 
 
 
 160.  I recognize, of course, that the details matter here. It would not be appropriate, for 
example, for a court to require a marking of a size or in a location that would frustrate 
Kohler’s ability to benefit from the attractiveness of the design. 
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